CRATES ON POETIC CRITICISM

ELIZABETH ASMIS

CRATES OF MALLOS IS WELL KNOWN in classical scholarship, but his reputation is not very enviable. Although posterity has admired his learning, he is regarded as something of a crank. Even Varro, who borrowed from him, accused him of obtuseness. I would like to suggest in this paper that Crates deserves a better fate. He developed a theory of poetry that is not widely known today, but ranks as a major contribution to the history of aesthetics.

Crates' poetic theory is preserved in approximately five continuous columns (21.25–26.18) of Book 5 of Philodemus' *On Poems*. Before we turn to this text, it is useful to have an overview of Crates' activity as a "critic." A contemporary of the grammarian Aristarchus in the first part of the second century B.C., Crates identified himself as a "critic." He subordinated the grammarian to the critic as "servant" to a "master craftsman" (ἀρχιτέκτων). The critic, he explained, is "experienced in all knowledge of language (πάσης ... λογικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔμπειρον)," whereas the grammarian knows only words of unusual meaning ("glosses"), pronunciation, and the like.[1] According to Sextus Empiricus, all "critics" subordinated the grammarian to the critic

The following works will be cited by author's name alone: Christian Jensen (ed. and tr.), *Philodemos Über die Gedichte Fünftes Buch* (Berlin 1923) (I have used Jensen's text unless otherwise indicated); Cecilia Mangoni, "Il PHerc. 228," *CronErcol* 19 (1989) 179–186; H. J. Mette, *Sphairopoiia: Untersuchungen zur Kosmologie des Krates von Pergamon* (Munich 1936) (containing testimonies and fragments 1–51); and *idem*, *Parateresis, Untersuchungen zur Sprachtheorie des Krates von Pergamon* (Halle 1952) (containing fragments 52–86). Addenda to both books are found in Mette, "Krates von Pergamon 1953–1983," *Lustrum* 26 (1984) 95–104; Francesco Sbordone (ed. and tr.), *Ricerche sui Papiri Ercolanesi* 2 (Naples 1976). This volume consists of three parts: tractatus A, *PHerc* 994; tractatus B, *PHerc* 460 + 1073; and tractatus C, *PHerc* 1074 + 1081 + 1676.

[1]Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 1.79: καὶ τὸν μὲν κριτικὸν πάσης, φησί, δεῖ λογικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔμπειρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ γραμματικὸν ἁπλῶς γλωσσῶν ἐξηγητικὸν καὶ προσῳδίας ἀποδοτικὸν καὶ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίων εἰδήμονα. παρὸ καὶ ἐοικέναι ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἀρχιτέκτονι τὸν δὲ γραμματικὸν ὑπηρέτῃ. Accordingly, Athenaeus (*Deipnosophistae* 11.80, fr. 26a Mette) refers to Crates as "critic." But Crates' self-definition did not prevent others from identifying him as a "grammarian," e.g., Diogenes Laertius 4.23 (T. 2 Mette), Strabo 14.5.16 (T. 3 Mette), Aetius 3.17 (Fr. 7 Mette), Pliny *Natural History* 1.4 (Fr. 9 Mette), and others. Sextus (*Adv. math.* 1.44) writes that Crates, along with Aristarchus and Aristophanes, worked out the art of "grammar" in its perfection: cf. Strabo 1.2.24 (Fr. 34c Mette). The history of the name "critic" is confused. There is a tradition that grammarians were first called "critics" (Dio of Prusa *Oratio* 53.1 = fr. 19 Mette, and the scholiast on Dionysius Thrax, 3.23 and 7.23 Hilgard); cf. Clement of Alexandria *Stromateis* 1.16.79. Dirk M. Schenkeveld surveys the "critics," including Crates, in "ΟΙ ΚΡΙΤΙΚΟΙ in Philodemus," *Mnemosyne* 21 (1968) 176–214.

PHOENIX, VOL. 46 (1991) 2.

(*Adv. math.* 1.248). This relationship was a matter of controversy. The grammarians differed widely among themselves about the nature and scope of their discipline. Some regarded it as an empirical skill, consisting of a collection of observations, others elevated it into a rationally worked out system. Some confined its scope to literary compositions, others extended it to non-literary language. In a formulation that approximates Crates' claim about the critic, a commentator on the *Art of Grammar* of Dionysius Thrax writes that "the grammarian must deal with all the practice of language."[2] Crates took a very narrow view of grammar, while assigning to the critic the ambitious aim of putting into practice a complete knowledge of language. "Criticism," as he saw it, is a master-science of language, comprising grammar, linguistics, and literary criticism.

In Crates' formulation, "experience" consists in the application of universal principles, which are an object of "knowledge." His choice of the term λογική suggests that he viewed the critic's knowledge as a counterpart of philosophical λογική. In Stoicism, λογικὴ ἐπιστήμη is one of three parts of philosophy, along with physics and ethics. The Stoics regarded dialectic and rhetoric as two main divisions of λογική, and divided dialectic in turn into the study of sound (φωνή) and the study of meanings (Diogenes Laertius 7.41–44). Although Stoic λογική is primarily the knowledge of argument, or "logic," Crates' demand for "all" λογική indicates that he required of the critic a similar breadth of linguistic knowledge, ranging from the sound of letters to the meanings of words, sentences, and, ultimately, complete literary works.

In the *Souda*, Crates is listed as a "Stoic philosopher" who had the appellation "Homeric" and "critic."[3] Crates owed the title "Homeric" to his substantial commentaries on Homer.[4] There is no evidence that Crates did any philosophy except what κριτική and philosophy have in common, although there is evidence that he was affiliated with the Stoics. In his controversy with the grammarian Aristarchus on whether custom (anomaly) or analogy determines correct word usage, Crates claimed to follow Chrysippus.[5] As we shall see, Crates also practised allegorical and etymological explanations in the manner of the Stoics. His euphonic theory of poetry, I shall suggest, is imbued with Stoic principles, even though it also departs radically from

[2]δεῖ τὸν γραμματικὸν παντὸς ἅπτεσθαι λογικοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος (7.27–28 Hilgard); this formulation leaves open whether the grammarian has "knowledge." On the various definitions of grammar, see esp. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 1.57–90.

[3]T. 1 Mette: φιλόσοφος Στωικός, ὃς ἐπεκλήθη Ὁμηρικὸς καὶ κριτικὸς διὰ τὴν καὶ περὶ τοὺς γραμματικοὺς καὶ ποιητικοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ ἐπίστασιν.

[4]On the type of commentary, see the article by W. Kroll on Crates in *RE* 11 (1922) 1634–35, and Rudolf Pfeiffer's remarks in *History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford 1968) 238–239.

[5]Varro *De lingua latina* 9.1 (Hülser 640, Fr. 64a Mette). Panaetius said that he was a pupil of Crates (T. 3 Mette = Strabo 14.5.16); but this relationship does not imply any Stoicism on Crates' part.

Stoic assumptions about poetry. Crates' Stoic leanings explain why he was called a "Stoic," but are insufficient to justify his being classified as a "Stoic philosopher" or even a "Stoic" simply. Strictly, Crates was a "critic"; and he can only be called a "Stoic philosopher" in the very loose sense of someone who shared some philosophical interests and doctrines with the Stoics.

Tauriscus, a pupil of Crates, recognized three branches of "criticism": τὸ λογικόν, dealing with "diction and grammatical forms," τὸ τριβικόν, dealing with dialects and differences of style, and τὸ ἱστορικόν, dealing with the "available," "unmethodical material."[6] The divisions might be headed "reason," "practice," and "inquiry." According to the commonplace opposition between λόγος and τριβή ("habit," "practice"), and between τριβή (or ἐμπειρία, "experience") and ἱστορία ("inquiry"), one might expect the three parts to correspond to different methods of investigation. Thus, the first division would consist of rational analysis, the second of habitual, first-hand experience, and the third of inquiry made by others. Sextus points out that "inquiry," which deals with the subject matter of poetry and prose (such as characters, places, times, and actions), is considered by most people a "non-technical" (ἄτεχνον) part of grammar.[7] The reason, we may infer, is that the grammarian or critic does not have expert knowledge of the subject matter; he does not presume to know the content in a methodical way, but merely surveys the "available" material. Following the mainstream of opinion, Sextus divides grammar into three parts: a "technical" part, "inquiry," and the interpretation of poems and prose writings. The first part deals with linguistic expression, starting with individual letter sounds. The third part, which presupposes the other two parts, deals with the clarity, soundness, and authenticity of literary texts (*Adv. math* 1.91–93).

Although it is not clear how Crates divided the art of criticism, there is no reason to doubt that he included all three of Tauriscus' branches of criticism and Sextus' branches of grammar in some form or other. In common with others, Crates considered the subject matter of poems a "non-technical" part of criticism.[8] He therefore recognized at least two divisions of criticism, the analysis of language and "inquiry." Technical knowledge and non-technical learning together form the basis on which the critic judges poems and prose works. The grammarian, too, judges literary works on this basis. But there is a fundamental difference in the way that the "critics" and those whom they called "grammarians" judged poems; and this seems indeed the essential difference between "critic" and "grammarian" as Crates

[6]Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 1.248–249, including λογικὸν μὲν τό στρεφόμενον περὶ τὴν λέξιν καὶ τοὺς γραμματικοὺς τρόπους, τριβικὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς διαλέκτους καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν πλασμάτων καὶ χαρακτήρων, ἱστορικὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν προχειρότητα τῆς ἀμεθόδου ὕλης.

[7]*Adv. math.* 1.252–254; cf. 1.92.

[8]Philodemus *On Poems* 5, col. 24.5–7 and *PHerc* 228, fr. 1A.15–16 Mangoni; see the discussion below.

defined these terms. As Philodemus shows, Crates presumed to "judge" (κρίνειν) whether a poem is good or not. Although there is considerable fluidity in the use of the terms "critic" and "grammarian," the "grammarians" seem on the whole to have aimed only to "judge" meaning, textual integrity, authenticity, and the like. The scholia on Dionysius Thrax, for example, state that the grammarian does not judge whether "poems are beautiful or bad," but whether they are genuine or spurious.[9] The "critic," with his comprehensive knowledge of language and wide learning, claims to be able to judge whether a poem is good or not; and this supreme power of judgment seems to be precisely what makes him a "critic." While claiming this power, the critic admits that he has only non-technical acquaintance with the subject matter. This is a defiant challenge to a tradition, led by Plato, which holds that a poem cannot be judged good or bad except by someone who knows, at least, whether the content is morally good or not.

There is good evidence that Crates dealt in detail with the whole range of subjects generally included under either grammar or criticism. At the most fundamental level, he undertook a systematic study of individual letter sounds or "elements," στοιχεῖα. Crates assigned special importance to this study and was one of the main contributors to it in antiquity. He is said to have defined στοιχεῖον as "the least part of sound (φωνή)."[10] As Philodemus shows, he held that poetic goodness consists of a pleasing arrangement of these elementary sounds. Another area of concern to Crates was the morphology of words, as shown by his debate with Aristarchus (Fr. 64 Mette). He wrote a work in at least five books on the "Attic Dialect" (Frs. 65–70 Mette). Along with sound and linguistic form, Crates studied the meanings of words, including etymology. He also investigated in detail the subject matter of poems. He was notorious for attempting to "turn" Homeric beliefs into "knowledge," and in particular for trying to show that Homer knew that the earth and the entire world are spherical.[11] Philodemus

[9]Scholia to Dionysius Thrax, 169.30–170.5 and 471.34–36 Hilgard; cf. 303.31–304.5. One commentator does say that the grammarian judges whether something has been said "beautifully or badly" (12.19–20, with the addition "in a particular place" at 15.28), but this does not amount to an overall judgment of whether a poem is good or bad. Despite his apparently restricted view of poetic judgment, Dionysius regarded the "judgment of poems" (κρίσιν ποημάτων) as the crowning and "most beautiful" of the six parts of grammar (8.3 Uhlig, etc.).

[10]Scholion to Dionysius Thrax, 316.24–25 (Fr. 52a Mette): φωνῆς μέρος τὸ ἐλάχιστον. See also Wolfram Ax, *Laut, Stimme und Sprache: Studien zu drei Grundbegriffen der antiken Sprachtheorie* (Göttingen 1986) 218–223.

[11]Strabo 3.4.4 (Fr. 30 Mette): [Crates and others] πρὸς ἐπιστημονικὰς ὑποθέσεις ἔτρεψαν τὴν Ὁμήρου ποίησιν. "Geminus" 16.27 (Fr. 34a Mette): Κράτης ... τὰ ὑφ' Ὁμήρου ἀρχαικῶς καὶ ἰδικῶς εἰρημένα μετάγει πρὸς τὴν κατ' ἀλήθειαν σφαιροποιίαν. On Homer's spherical cosmos, see esp. frs. 6 and 34 Mette, and pp. 53–58 and 66–96 of *Sphairopoiia*. Probably

cites Crates' view on the Homeric sphere as an example of how people want to interpret Homer allegorically right from the word "wrath." At the same time Philodemus distinguishes Crates from those who are "openly mad" in their allegorical explanations of Homer, so as to take Agamemnon, for example, to stand for aether, and Achilles for the sun.[12] Although Crates did research in many fields, including geography and cosmology, this work appears to be subordinate to his work as a critic, as non-technical "inquiry" rather than properly scientific investigation.

Philodemus summarizes the critics' view of poetic goodness in a part of *On Poems* whose place in the whole treatise is unknown.

PHerc 1676, tr. C, col. 17(6).1–14 Sb:

1	σύνθε[σιν ... ἐξ-]	... to work out composition
	ἐργάζεσ[θαι ... καὶ τὸ τὴν μὲν	... that the supervening
	ἐπιφαι]νομένην [ε]ὐφωνί-	euphony is [the] distinctive,
	αν ἴδιον [εἶν]αι, τὰ δέ νοή{ι}-	[task of the poet] and that
5	ματα καὶ [τ]ὰς λέξεις ἐκτὸς	thoughts and diction are outside
	εἶναι καὶ κοινὰ συνάγεσ-	[the poetic craft] and must
	θαι δεῖ[ν, πα]ρὰ πᾶσι μὲν ὡς	be collected as things that
	ἐν [στήλ]ηι μέ[ν]ει τοῖς κρι-	are common, remains as
	τικοῖ[ς], βλεπο[μ]ένην δ' ἔ-	though graven on stone
10	χει τὴ[ν ἀλ]ήθι[α]ν ἐκ τῶν	for all the critics; its truth can
	εἰρημένων. φωνὴν μὲγ	be seen from what has been
	γὰρ οὐδεὶς ποητὴς εἴσχυ-	said. For no poet has had the
	σεν εἰ[σπο]ῆσαι τοιαύτην,	power to introduce the kind of
	οἵα ... τὴν φύσιν	sound that ... the nature ...[13]

According to the critics, Philodemus reports, poets take thoughts and diction as material from "outside" the poetic craft, with the aim of fashioning them into a verbal composition that has good sound, εὐφωνία.[14]

---

in connection with the "making of the sphere," Crates proposed that Homer's story of Zeus hurling Hephaestus from Olympus signifies the use of fire to measure the world (Fr. 22 Mette).

[12] *On Poems*, *PHerc* 1676, tr. A, cols. 2–3 Sbordone (Fr. 20 Mette).

[13] I have supplied [ἐξ-] in the first line. Jensen fills out line 14 with [πέφυκ]εν and continues with the implausible reading (line 15): τῶι [κάλλει] παρα[φ]έρειν. I indicate omissions of any length by three dots.

[14] In agreement with others, Philodemus regularly uses the term σύνθεσις (an abbreviation for σύνθεσις τῶν λέξεων) to mean "verbal composition." As Dionysius of Halicarnassus explains, the topic of λέξις is distinct from the topic of subject matter (πράγματα or νοήματα) and has two parts, ἐκλογή and σύνθεσις (*De compositione* 1–2, pp. 66 and 72 Roberts). In the extant portions of *On Poems*, Philodemus seems to identify only one person as a "critic," Pausimachus: ... Παυσίμα[χος ὁ κρι]τικὸς ἆρά γε δν [ἐν εὐη]χίαι τὸ καλόν ... ("the critic Pausimachus [placed] beauty in good sound," *PHerc* 994, tr. A, col. w.24–26). The restorations κριτικὸς and εὐηχίαι are plausible, though by no means certain. It is possible that some "critics," such as Pausi-

As "common" material, the thoughts and diction are shared not only with other poets, but also with experts in other fields, such as geographers, historians, physicians, generals, and so on. Good sound is an immediately apparent feature (-φαινομένην) that supervenes on (ἐπι-) the verbal structure.[15] The distinctive contribution (ἴδιον) of a poet is nothing other than well-sounding verbal composition. Philodemus' immediate objection, which is cut short by a lacuna in our text, is that good sound, as proposed by the critics, is an impossibility. In Book 5 of *On Poems*, he criticizes a Stoic theorist, possibly Aristo of Chios, for admitting the "uncreated euphonies of the critics" (ἀγε[νή]/τοις εὐφωνίαις τῶν κ[ρι]/τικῶν) as a requirement of poetic composition.[16] The euphony of the critics, Philodemus objects, has never yet come into existence. In the above summary, he continues his attack by adding that distinctive verbal composition is "not opportune or praised in itself, but because it also presents thoughts by which poets move the soul, not taking them from someone, but creating them themselves from themselves."[17] As Philodemus insists throughout *On Poems*, the poet is responsible not only for the verbal structure, but also, most of all, for the thought (διάνοια) that goes with it.

---

machus, preferred the term εὐηχία to εὐφωνία, while endorsing the common view that what makes a poem good is its sound. Whereas φωνή signifies vocal sound, which may have meaning, ἦχος refers to any kind of sound, considered apart from meaning. Pausimachus also seems to be mentioned at *PHerc* 994, tr. A, cols. y.1 and e.23 Sbordone.

[15] Philodemus repeatedly describes euphony as an ἐπιφαινόμενον: see *PHerc* 1676, tr. C, col. 18 (7).11–12 Sbordone, and cols. 20.28 and 21.31 of *On Poems* 5; cf. *PHerc* 994, tr. A, col. y.5–6 Sbordone, and *PHerc* 1081 + 1074, tr. C, fr. b, col. 1.9 Sbordone. In a related use, Philodemus denies that music shows (ἐπιφαίνει) such ἤθη as manliness and cowardice, restraint and boldness, grandeur and lowliness (*On Music* 4, col. 3.26–35 Neubecker). Against the theory of epiphenomenal character traits in music, Philodemus objects that a great diversity of "supervening moral habits" (ἐπιφαινομένων ἠθῶν) is assigned to the same dithyrambic modes (*On Music* 1, fr. 18.11–12 Kemke, fr. 23 Rispoli). An "epiphenomenon" (which is not to be confused with "epiphenomenon" in the modern sense) is recognized directly by the observer, together with the phenomenon on which it supervenes. The term is used repeatedly in ps.-Aristotle's *Physiognomics* to refer to moral characteristics (ἤθη), such as anger, grief, or shame, that can be read off the face (ἐπὶ τῶν προσώπων [ἐπιφαινόμενα], see esp. 805a–b). Two examples provided by Plutarch are: "a certain athletic form appears on (ἐπιφαίνεται) the statues" (*Aratus* 3.2); and Aratus' "choice and character (ἦθος) appeared (ἐπεφαίνετο) like a color (χρῶμα) on the actions of the king" (*Aratus* 48.3).

[16] *On Poems* 5, col. 18.15–17. Only the last two letters (ων) of the name of this Stoic are preserved (col. 13.30); see further, E. Asmis, "The Poetic Theory of the Stoic 'Aristo'," *Apeiron* 23 (1990) 147–201.

[17] *PHerc* 1676, tr. C, col. 17(6).19–27 Sbordone: ... ἡ σύνθε/σις ἰδ[ία γε]ίνεται τῶν πο/ητῶν, οὐ καίριος οὐδ' ἐπαι/νουμένη καθ' αὑτήν ἀλ/λ' ὅτι π[ρο]σπαρίστησι διαν[οί/ας, αἷς ψ[υ]χ-αγωγοῦσιν οὐ / παρά τινος λαβόντες, ἀλ/λ' αὐτοὶ γεννήσαντες πα/ρ' α[ὑτ]ῶν.

CRATES' CRITIQUE OF POETRY (PHILODEMUS *ON POEMS* 5, COLS. 21.25–26.18)

In common with other "critics," Crates held that what makes a poem good is euphonious verbal composition. As might be expected, the "critics" differed in their interpretation of this principle. Philodemus provides a glimpse of these differences in his introduction to Crates' poetics in the fifth book of *On Poems*:

21 25	... τὰ [παρὰ] τῶι Κράτ[η-	... it is time to consider
	τι και]ρὸ[ς θ]εωρῆσαι.	the views of Crates. He departs
	ἀπο[τυγ]χάνει τοιγα[ρ-	from the opinion of Heracleodorus
	οὖν [τῆ]ς Ἡρακλεοδώρου	and the like—for instead of
	καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων δόξης—	praising the composition, he
30	οὐ γ]ὰρ τὴν σύνθεσιν, ἀλ-	praises the sound that supervenes
	λὰ τὴν ἐπιφαινομένην	on it—, just as he also departs
	α]ὐ[τῆι] φωνὴ[ν] ἐπ[αι]ν[εῖ—	from the opinion of Andro-
	ὡς κ]αὶ τῆς Ἀνδρομενίδ[ου,	menides, although he thinks
	πά]ν[τα] γε νομίζων ὁ-	that Andromenides agrees in
35	μολ]ογεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ διὰ	every respect and totally with
22 1	πα]ντὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις.	what he says.

Unlike Heracleodorus and his group, Philodemus claims, Crates proposed that what is praiseworthy in a poem is not the verbal composition, but the sound, φωνή, that supervenes on it. Although Philodemus does not use the term εὐφωνία anywhere in his discussion of Crates, we may assume that the term was used by Crates to designate praiseworthy sound. Philodemus thinks that Crates is also in disagreement with Andromenides, even though Crates insisted that there was complete unanimity between himself and Andromenides.

Philodemus mentions both Heracleodorus and Andromenides elsewhere in *On Poems*. Heracleodorus, he reports, held that thoughts altogether do not "move" the soul, not even when they have been worked out poetically.[18] It remains that verbal composition moves the listener. Although it is not certain whether Heracleodorus was a "critic" and euphonist, the few details provided by Philodemus support the view that he was a critic who "praised" composition that has good sound.[19] Crates might have distinguished his position by asserting that what makes a poem good is precisely the supervening sound, not the composition on which good sound supervenes.

[18] *PHerc* 1081, tr. C., fr. n.6–9 Sbordone. Philodemus also mentions Heracleodorus in *PHerc* 1676 as arguing "on behalf of unclarity" (tr. C, col. 3.28–29 Sbordone).

[19] Heracleodorus has generally been identified as a "critic." In particular, H. Gomoll ("Herakleodorus und die ΚΡΙΤΙΚΟΙ bei Philodem," *Philologus* 91 [1936] 373–384) has argued that Philodemus attacks Heracleodorus as a "critic" from col. 13(2) to col. 18(7).17 Sbordone of *PHerc* 1676.

In another part of *On Poems*, Philodemus attributes the following position to Andromenides:

> Andromenides ... posits that it is appropriate for poets to work out dialect and wording (ὀνομασίας), and that it is the function (ἔργον) of poets not to say what no one [else would say], but to speak in such a way as no one else would interpret (ἑρμη[νεύσ]ειε) [a subject matter] and [to construct] a catharsis ... and ... of Muses ... and sounds. [He posited] that humans naturally care for ... and have a self-learned kinship with the Muses, as is shown by the inarticulate (ἀγραμμάτου) chants that are sung to put infants to sleep, and beautiful locutions ... with respect to the hearing and splendid letters ... and what kinds of letters and how many ....[20]

The fragment shows that there really is a theoretical affinity between Andromenides and Crates. Andromenides took lullabies, chanted without articulated letters, as evidence of a natural bond between humans and music. Since the sound of these songs is not verbal, their effect lies entirely in their musical quality, not their meaning. It is incumbent on the poet, it seems, to work out words that have a similar musicality. In an apparent revision of Aristotle's notion of catharsis, Andromenides linked poetic wording with catharsis. Presumably he held that poetic catharsis is analogous to the relaxation produced by wordless lullabies. The last part of the fragment indicates that the poet creates beautiful words out of various letters. All of this agrees with what Philodemus reports about Crates' poetic theory. It is not clear, therefore, why Philodemus thinks there is a difference. Most likely, Andromenides' emphasis on dialect and wording prompted Philodemus to classify him, along with Heracleodorus, as a proponent of good verbal composition rather than good sound. Crates' insistence on total agreement between himself and Andromenides suggests that he revered Andromenides, possibly as his teacher.[21]

[20] *PHerc* 460, tr. C, fr. 26, col. 3.2–27 Sbordone, Jensen p. 150, including τοὺς τῶν βρεφῶν ὑπὸ / τῆς ὠιδῆς τῆς ἀγραμ/μάτου κατακοιμισμούς. Although Jensen supplies the name Andromenides on the basis of just the letters A[.....]/ΔΗC (with a lacuna of seven or eight letters), the restoration is reasonably certain. It is possible that at lines 3–5 Philodemus makes the same point as in *On Poems* 5, that Andromenides did not agree with Crates. [ἑρμνηνεί]ας at 12–13 should probably be replaced by an objective genitive signifying emotional excess or mental disturbance in general, such as [ἀταραξί]ας (to select one out of numerous possibilities).

[21] Andromenides' name occurs clearly in another fragment, *PHerc* 1073, tr. B, fr. 25 col. 2.24–25 Sbordone, p. 152 Jensen, where the tripartite division of the art of poetry into poet, "poetry" (ποίησις), and "poem" (ποίημα) seems to be imputed to him. Jensen has also restored the name of Crates in this fragment, but this supplement is doubtful. It is possible that Crates followed Andromenides in adopting the same tripartite division, even though there is no sign of it in Philodemus' report about Crates. See further below, n. 53, and my forthcoming paper, "Neoptolemus and the Classification of Poetry" *CP* 87 (1992). Philodemus also summarizes Andromenides' position (though without his

Let us now return to Philodemus' report about Crates. After his brief introduction, Philodemus launches a criticism of Crates in two parts: first is a response to Crates' criticism of others (cols. 22.2–24.13); second is an attack on Crates' own views (cols. 24.13–26.18). It appears that Crates prefaced his own presentation with an analysis of the inadequacies of other theories, then went on to outline his theory. Philodemus' point-by-point criticism of Crates follows on a summary of Crates' position in an earlier part of *On Poems*. We have a few remnants of this summary, which probably belongs to the first, lost part of Book 5. Philodemus' criticism is well organized, but poses difficulties for the reader because it presupposes the earlier summary. It is some compensation that his critical remarks, though brief, are well preserved.

In the polemical section of his work, Crates took on two groups of opponents: philosophers and other critics. Philodemus first deals at length with Crates' dispute with the philosophers. Whereas the philosophers claimed that poems must be judged according to imposed rules or "regulations" (θέματα), Crates proposed that they must be judged according to standards that exist by nature (φύσει).[22] Crates did not identify the philosophers; but something in his account points to the Epicureans. For Philodemus says that if he alluded to the Epicureans, he is talking nonsense. Motivated in part by a desire to set the Epicurean position straight, Philodemus tries to adjudicate the dispute between the philosophers and Crates. Casting doubt on the accuracy of Crates' characterization, he partially defends, partially faults, Crates' philosophical opponents:

22	2	τ[οὺς] δὲ θ[έ]ματα φ[ά]σκοντας εἶναι φιλοσόφους, π[ρὸ]ς ἃ [δ]εῖ βλέποντας κρίνειν,	As for the philosophers who claim that there are regulations to which one must look in judging [a poem]
	5	καὶ] τὰ λοιπὰ προστιθέντ]ας ἃ κατέγραψεν, εἰ μὲν	and who add all the rest that he noted, if he was alluding to

name) in *PHerc* 1081, tr. D, fr. 23.12–23 Nardelli (F. Sbordone [ed.], *Ricerche sui Papiri Ercolanesi* 4 [Naples 1983]): "he seems to assert well that it is not the function of poets to say what no one [says], but to speak in such a way as no one [speaks] who is not a poet; yet [he seems to assert] badly that the [poet's] function will be realized if he selects locutions that are more beautiful than those [conventionally] assigned to it (?), and circumvents more ugly locutions and in this way .... " Andromenides has generally been identified as a Peripatetic; see further Costantina Romeo (ed. and tr.), *Demetrio Lacone, La Poesia (PHerc 188 e 1014)* (Naples 1988) 45–50.

[22]The use of the term θέμα as the opposite of φύσις seems to be a Hellenistic development. The contrast is found in grammar, as well as other disciplines. According to Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* 1.143–153) grammarians distinguished between nouns that are "naturally" (φύσει) masculine, feminine, and neuter, and those that are so "by regulation" (κατὰ θεματισμόν, 1.149; cf. θεματισθέν, 1.153, etc.). Vitruvius (1.2.5–7) distinguishes between θεματισμός, custom (*consuetudo*), and nature in architecture. See further below, n. 26.

τ]οὺς περὶ τὸν 'Επίκουρον
ἡιν]ίττετο, φλύαρος ἦν,
ὡς καὶ γέγονε καὶ γενή-
σ[ε]ται π[ρο]ιόντω[ν] συμ-
φ[α]νές. εἰ δ' ἄλλους τινάς,
ἐ[κ]εῖνοι τὸ μ[ὲ]ν ἠλήθευ-
ο[ν, τ]ὸ δ' ἐψεύδ[ον]το, τὰ δὲ
παρέλειπο[ν. π]αρέλειπομ
μὲν ὅλως τὰς ἐννοίας
τῶν ἀστείων καὶ [φαύλων
ποιημάτων καὶ ποιή-
σεων], ἠλήθ[ε]υ[ο]ν δὲ φυ-
σικὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐν ποιήμα-
τι μηδὲν εἶναι λέγον-
τες, εἴπερ τοῦτ' ἔφασκον.
ὃ [γὰρ] οὗτος ἔθηκεν ἀδιά-
ληπτόν ἐστιν. ἐψεύ-
δοντο δὲ θ[έμ]ατα πάν-
τα [νο]μίζοντες εἶνα[ι κ]αὶ
κρίσ[ιν] οὐχ ὑπάρχε[ιν τῶν
ἀστείων ἐπῶν καὶ [φαύ-
λων κοινήν, ἀλλὰ πα-
ρ' ἄλλοις ἄλλην, ὡς τὴν
νομίμων. [κα]ὶ γὰρ κα-
θὸ πόημα φυσικὸν οὐδὲν
οὔτε λέξεως οὔτε δ[ια-
ν]οήματος ὠφέλημα [πα-
ρ]ασκευάζει. διὰ τοῦτ[ο
δ[ὲ] τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστηκότες
23 1 ὑπόκεινται σκ[οπ]οί, τῆι
μὲν λέξει τὸ μ[εμι]μῆσ-
θαι τὴν ὠφέλι[μα] προσ-
διδάσκουσαν, τῆς δὲ δι-
ανοίας τὸ μεταξὺ μετ[εσχη-
κέναι τῆς τῶν σοφῶν
καὶ τῆς τῶν χυδαίων,
καὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ἄν τε νο-
μίσῃ τις ἄν τε μή, καὶ
κριτέον ἐπὶ τ[αῦ]τ' ἐπα-
νάγοντας. ἐῶ γὰρ ὅτι
κἂν μίμησ[ίς τ]ις ἐν τοι-
αύτηι κατ[ασκ]ευῆι—τὸ
ποίημα δ' ἐ[στὶ] τὸ μιμού-
μενον ὡς ἐνδέχεται—
μάλιστ' ἐν τοιαύτηι κοι-
νὸν ἀποδώσει<ε> κρῖμα πᾶ-

the Epicureans, he was
talking nonsense, as has
become clear and will
become clear as we go on.
But if he meant certain others,
they said partly what is
truthful and partly what
is false, and omitted
other things. They omitted
altogether the notions of
fine and bad poems and
poetry, but they spoke the
truth in saying that there is
no natural good in a poem,
if indeed they claimed this.
For what he posited is
confused. They were wrong
in thinking that everything
is regulations and that there
is no common judgment
of fine and bad verses, but
that judgment varies from
one group to another, just like
the judgment of what is lawful.
Indeed, a poem insofar as it is a
poem provides no natural benefit
either in diction or in thought.
That is why basic aims for
goodness have been established:
for diction, that it should
imitate diction that
also teaches what is useful; and
for thought, that it should
partake of thought that is
intermediate between the thought
of the wise and that of the vulgar.
This is the case whether one thinks
so or not, and one must judge by
referring to these [standards]. For
I omit that an imitation with this
kind of elaboration—and a poem
is that which imitates in the way
it can— would most of all afford
a common judgment for all people
in this kind [of elaboration], but
[a common judgment would not be

σιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κα[θ]' ἕκαστον θέμα τοῖς δι[α]ταξαμέ-
20 νοις.

possible] for those who have classified [a poem] according to each regulation.[23]

Philodemus presents three competing views: (1) the philosophical view that there are regulations (θέματα) by which poems must be judged; (2) Crates' view that there is a natural goodness in poems; and (3) the view that there are common notions by which poems must be judged. The third view is Epicurean; and neither Crates nor the philosophers attacked by him take it into account. The Epicureans, therefore, are not among the philosophers who support (1).

The general topic of debate is: what makes a poem good? This question is understood narrowly as: what makes a poem useful? Philodemus shows that poetic utility is at stake when, after agreeing with the philosophers that there is no "natural good in a poem," he adds that a poem as such provides "no natural utility either of diction or of thought" and then proposes commonly agreed standards of utility. Philodemus' use of the Stoic terms ἀστεῖα and φαῦλα, "fine" and "bad," also implies utility. Following Plato, the Stoics identified "fine" poems with "useful" poems.[24] Philodemus argues that poems must be judged by reference to universally agreed goals of utility, not by reference to "regulations" (that is, imposed rules or stipulations) nor, as Crates would have it, in accordance with some "natural utility" that inheres in poems.

Philodemus in effect inserts the Epicureans as a third party into the debate between Crates and the philosophers. The Epicureans claim that there is a common notion of poetic utility, which is the same for all people; in Epicurean technical language, this is a "preconception" or "presumption" (πρόληψις). According to the Epicureans, all opinions are judged by reference to such notions, which are formed empirically and naturally, instead of being imposed by others.[25] Whereas "preconceptions" are common to all people, "regulations" (θέματα) differ among people, just like laws. Philodemus rejects stipulative criteria of poetic goodness just as much as Crates, but proposes an entirely different kind of natural criterion.[26]

[23]I have also discussed this passage in connection with Philodemus' own views on poetry in "Philodemus' Poetic Theory and *On the Good King According to Homer*," *ClAnt* 10 (1991) 1–45, at 7–11.

[24]The Stoic theorist ("Aristo"), criticized by Philodemus in *On Poems* 5, cols. 14–21, uses ἀστεῖον coextensively with "worthwhile" (σπουδαῖον) and "useful" (χρηστόν).

[25]On Epicurean preconceptions, see Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 37–38, and Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.44–45.

[26]To avoid confusion, Philodemus does not call this criterion "natural." At *On Poems* 5, col. 31.14–17, Philodemus rejects the view that poetic goodness consists in a good imitation of traditional poets such as Homer; his reason is that it makes the judgment of a beautiful poem wholly "stipulative," "by regulation" (θεματικήν). In *On Rhetoric* 4,

According to the common notion of "fine and bad poems," Philodemus proposes, there are two underlying aims: (1) for diction, that it must "imitate (μεμιμῆσθαι) diction that also teaches what is useful"; (2) for thought, that it must "partake (μετεσχηκέναι) of thought that is intermediate between the thought of the wise and that of the vulgar." These standards are a response not only to Crates, but also to Plato. In Book 3 of the *Republic*, Plato distinguished between two kinds of diction (λέξις), "imitative" (that is, "impersonating," phrased as direct speech) and "narrative" (reporting in indirect speech what a character said), and demanded that the former must imitate the speech of a good person. In a famous passage, Plato proposed to admit to his newly founded city "for the sake of utility" (ὠφελίας ἕνεκα) only the poet "who imitates the diction of a good person (τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο) and speaks in those patterns (τύποις) that we set down as laws (ἐνομοθετησάμεθα) at the beginning . . . . "[27] In place of Plato's demand that the poet should "imitate the diction of a good person," Philodemus says that poetic diction should "imitate diction that also teaches what is useful." Philodemus could have used much simpler wording by omitting "imitate" and demanding only that the diction should "also teach what is useful."[28] Instead, he responds to Plato by viewing poetic diction as an imitation of diction.[29] He continues his response in his second requirement, the requirement for "thought," by rejecting Plato's demand for morally exemplary characters. Philodemus now shows what he means by "useful" by demanding that the thought must "partake" of thought that is "intermediate" between the thought of the wise and that of

---

v. 1, p. 151 Sudhaus, Philodemus argues that since there is "naturally beautiful speech," φυσικῶς καλὸς λόγος, there is no need for speech that is beautiful "by regulation," κατὰ θέμα. Presumably, he means that the former type of speech measures up to our common notions of beautiful speech. In this argument, Philodemus elaborates a point made in his discussion of Crates: τὸ θεματικόν "does not prevail among all [persons], nor does the same [type prevail] with the same [persons] or in certain speeches, but some [admire the diction] of Isocrates, or Thucydides . . . . " The comparison of θέματα in poetry with lawful things (νόμιμα) suits Philodemus' argument because the distinction between nature and regulation applies also to the judgment of what is just. In *On Rhetoric*, v. 1, cols. 21–24, pp. 254–259 Sudhaus, Philodemus distinguishes between natural justice, which is the same for all and is known by a common notion (πρόληψις), and justice by regulation (θέμα), which consists of particular laws that differ among people.

[27] *Republic* 3.398a–b: αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ χρῴμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὠφελίας ἕνεκα, ὃς ἡμῖν τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποις οἷς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐνομοθετησάμεθα, ὅτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπεχειροῦμεν παιδεύειν.

[28] The prefix πρόσ- in προσ-διδάσκουσαν signifies that diction has other functions besides teaching what is useful.

[29] It is not clear whether Philodemus here also agrees to the restricted meaning of "imitation" (that is, "impersonation") that Plato uses in the third book of the *Republic*. Later in the passage (col. 23.14–15), he uses "imitation" in a much broader sense to apply to poems in general.

the vulgar. Just as Philodemus' apparently circumlocutory "imitate" takes issue with Plato's notion of imitation, so Philodemus' use of the verb "partake" (μετεσχηκέναι) alludes to the Platonic theory of Forms. Whereas Plato proposed that the poet must present moral habits that are modelled on the Forms of the virtues, Philodemus demands only commonplace morality. It follows that instead of being judged by the expert knowledge of the wise the moral utility of poems is judged by the ordinary intuitions of common people.

In his reform of poetry in Books 2 and 3 of the *Republic*, Plato set out "patterns" (τύποι) of moral behaviour as "laws" (νόμοι) for the poet. As the verb νομοθετεῖν shows, these patterns and laws are conspicuous examples of θέματα proposed by philosophers for the regulation of poetry. By opposing these "imposed rules" with ordinary notions of good poems Philodemus indicates that Plato and similar philosophers, not the Epicureans, are among the philosophers who endorsed view (1). It is plausible that in his attack on the philosophers Crates also had Plato in mind; but he may well have directed the brunt of his attack against the Epicureans. As Philodemus illustrates, the Epicureans scoffed at the notion of an inherent natural poetic good. The Epicureans also drew a distinction between an initial "natural" stage in the development of human skills, and a subsequent "regulatory" (θέσει) stage, in which rules and new discoveries are "imposed" (τεθῆναι).[30] The general contrast between φύσις and θέματα fits Epicureanism very neatly. It is therefore likely, as Philodemus suspects, that Crates alluded to the Epicureans. Against this insinuation, Philodemus contends that Crates' attack is valid only against philosophers such as Plato, who did attempt to impose arbitrary rules of poetic utility.

After defending the Epicureans, Philodemus attacks Crates:

23 20	... αὐτὸς δὲ γελοῖος	He himself was ridiculous
	ἦν ταύτας μ[όν]ον ὑπο-	in claiming that there have
	λήψεις γεγονέναι περὶ	been only these assumptions
	ποίηματος ἀγαθοῦ πε-	about a good poem—and
	φ[ρα]κώς, τῶν δὲ φιλοσό-	only one held by the
25	φων τὴν μίαν, καὶ γρά-	philosophers—,
	φων τ[ὸ μὴ πιθ]α[νὸν εἶ-	and in writing that it is not
	ναι θέματα ὑπά[ρχει]ν,	plausible that there are regulations
	μαρτυρούσης γε δὴ [τ]ῆς	[i.e., by reference to which poems
	ἀκοῆς εἰς τοῦτο. δεχο-	must be judged], since the hearing
30	μ[έ]νων γὰρ ἡμῶν εἰς	bears witness to this. Although
	τὸ μὴ θέματ' εἶναι μαρ-	we accept that there is evidence
	τυρεῖν, οὐδέν ἐστι μα[ρτ]υ-	that it is not regulations [i.e., by
	ρούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ἀ[κο-	which poems are judged], nothing
	ῆς εἰς τοῦτο, τοῖς ὅλο[ις	is witnessed by the hearing to

[30]Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 75–76.

	35	οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐν ποιή[μ]α-	this; for the hearing has judgment
		τι κρίσιν ἐχούσης οὐδὲ	about nothing at all in a poem nor
24	1	μὰ Δία τερπ[ομ]ένη[ς π]λὴν	is it delighted, by Zeus, except
		ὑπὸ ῥυθμοῦ [τοῦ ποιήμα-	by the rhythm of a poem.
		τος, εἴπερ ἐ[π]εῖπε τὸ [μὴ	For he also said that it is not
		πιθανὸν εἶναι τ[ὴ]ν δ[ι-	plausible to praise the thought,
	5	άνοιαν ἐπαινεῖν, ἀτέ-	since this sort of thing is
		χνου γε δὴ τοῦ τοιούτου	non-technical.
		ὄντος, ὃ πρὸς τοὺς κριτι-	He says this
		κοὺς λέγει παραιτο[ύμε]ν[ος	in an appeal to the critics,
		ὁμολογούντων ἄτεχνον	who agree that ... is non-technical
	10	εἶναι * * λόγωι, τ[ε]τριμμέ-	... known [not] by reason
		νηι δ' ἀκο[ῆι γ]νωστόν. [δι-	but by practised hearing;
		όπερ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν	that is why they also
		ἐπαινεῖ[ν].	praise the thought.

Philodemus first concludes the previous discussion by accusing Crates of recognizing just "these" views of poetic utility, including the single view that he attributes to philosophers. What is "ridiculous" about Crates is that he recognizes only two positions, a naturalist view (to which he subscribes) and a stipulative view, which he attributes to the philosophers.

Philodemus then goes on to pour ridicule on Crates' own view. His earlier summary of Crates' theory allows us to follow the structure of the present argument. The summary includes the following section.

PHerc 228, fr. 1A.7–16:

	... πάντα	... Everything is judged by being
	δ' ἐμπείρως [θε]ωρούμε-	viewed empirically. For neither is
	ν]α κρίνεται, ἐπεὶ οὔτε	it plausible that there are regul-
10	θέματα πιθανὸν εἶνα[ι,	ations [i.e., by reference to which
	μαρτυρούσης γοῦν εἰς	poems must be judged], since the
	τοῦτο τῆς ἀκοῆ[ς, ο]ὗθ' ὅ-	hearing bears witness to this; nor,
	τ]αν ἡ αἴσθησι[ς] ἥδηται,	whenever sense perception takes
	ε]ὐθὺς καὶ τὴ[ν διά]νοιαν	pleasure, is it plausible to immedi-
15	πιθ]ανὸν ἐ[παι]νεῖν, ἀτέ-	ately praise the thought but ...
	χνου δὲ τοῦ	non-technical ....[31]

The summary presents two claims in support of the basic principle that poems are judged empirically (ἐμπείρως). First, Crates appeals to the evidence of hearing that it is not "regulations" by reference to which poems are judged. The hearing, he proposes, can tell naturally whether a poem is good or not. Second, Crates denies that the empirical judgment of a

[31]Mangoni reads δὲ τοῦ C[....]Y ὄν/τος in lines 16–17; Jensen reads [γ]ε τοῦ [τοιούτο]υ ὄν/τος.

poem extends to the judgment of a poem's thought: it is not the case that, whenever the hearing has pleasure, we immediately also praise the thought.

Philodemus rejects Crates' first point, while making a concession. "We," the Epicureans, he asserts, are willing to admit that there is evidence against regulations; but this evidence is not supplied by the hearing. Just before Crates, Philodemus criticized the Stoic "Aristo" for maintaining that good composition is "apprehended not by reason, but as a result of practised hearing" (οὐκ εἶναι λόγω[ι] κα/ταληπτήν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς [κα]/τὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν τριβῆ[ς]). Philodemus objected that it is bad enough to assign "the judgment" of euphony "to the practised hearing," and even worse to assign to it the judgment of verbal composition; for the hearing is an irrational faculty that does not concern itself at all with successes or failures and, what is more, cannot judge words with meanings.[32] In his criticism of Crates Philodemus reaffirms that the hearing cannot judge whether anything in a poem is good or not. Since the hearing cannot judge anything about a poem's goodness, it cannot "bear witness" (μαρτυρεῖν) that the goodness of a poem is not judged by reference to regulations. The kind of "witnessing," or direct evidence, that Philodemus does allow is the common notion of a good poem. So far from being able to judge that euphony makes a poem good, Philodemus contends, the hearing is not even delighted by it as a whole; for the only source of acoustic delight is rhythm.

Crates' second claim involves a controversy with "critics." Other critics, it seems, proposed to judge the thought of a poem on the basis of hearing, although they agreed with Crates that the thought is something "non-technical." As we saw earlier, most grammarians also classified the inquiry into subject matter as a non-technical part of their discipline. Hence the thought of a poem does not admit of expert judgment by the critic. However, whereas some critics apparently held that the thought of a poem can be judged jointly with the sound by means of experienced hearing, Crates proposed to withhold judgment of the thought altogether. The difference between these two positions is subtle and interesting. As we shall see, Crates maintained that whereas thoughts are not judged in themselves, the sound is judged "not without thoughts." The other critics, it appears, maintained that, since the hearing is delighted by the sound in conjunction with the thought, the thought can be pronounced praiseworthy along with the sound. Against this view Crates insisted that the thought cannot be judged praiseworthy on the basis of experienced hearing. He agreed with the other critics that poems are judged empirically by the hearing; but because he also assumed that the thought must be judged by technical expertise—that

[32] *On Poems* 5, cols. 20.21–21.11; see also the paper on "Aristo," cited above, n. 16, 186–187.

is, by the use of reason—he withheld judgment of a poem's thought.[33] The difference between the two positions seems to be that whereas the other critics assigned to a poem a content that has a poetic correctness of its own (that is, as a substrate of the sound), independently of the truth, Crates took the more traditional view that the content of poem cannot be judged except by someone who knows the truth. In the view of other critics, we praise Homer's grove, let us say, along with the sound of the words; according to Crates, we imagine the grove when praising the sound, but do not praise the imagined grove itself. His more rigorous stance, I suggest, is a concession to Stoicism, whose influence on Crates will become clearer.

Crates' appeal to the critics ends his refutation of others. He now turns to the constructive part of his exposition, an explanation of his own views. Philodemus examines these views in the remainder of his criticism. Crates' first point, as reported by Philodemus, is that the "natural difference in poems" is recognized by the hearing:

24 13	... τό γε μὴν	For the rest ... say
	λοιπὸν [τί δε]ῖ λέγειν, ὅ-	what he himself claims,
15	περ αὐτὸς [φάσκ]ει, καὶ δι-	it is silly because it
	ὰ τὸ τἀληθὲς ὑπερβαίνειν	exceeds the truth and
	εὐηθές ἐστιν καὶ διὰ τὸ	because he claims that
	φάσκειν δι[α]γινώσκεσ-	the natural difference
	θαι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν	that exists in poems
20	τοῖς ποιή[μ]ασ[ι]μ φυσικὴν	is discerned by the hearing.
	διαφορὰν τῆι [ἀκ]οῆι. πλὴν	For except that sounds that
	γὰρ τοῦ διαφόρους τῆι θέ-	differ in the placement and
	σ]ει καὶ τάξει τῶν γραμ-	arrangement of the letters
	μάτω[ν] προσπίπτειν	fall upon [the hearing],
25	φωνάς, οὐδέν ἐστιν	the hearing has nothing
	πρὸς ἀκοήν, ὅ[περ οὐ]δεὶς	to do with anything
	ἃ[ν] εἴπειε διά[γνωσ]ιν	that anyone would call
	τῆς ἐν ποιήματι φυσι-	a discernment of the natural
	κῆς διαφορᾶς. εἰ δὲ τοῦ-	difference in a poem.

[33]The controversy is obscured by an apparently faulty text at col. 24.10. The reading λόγωι, which is on the two transcripts and the papyrus, is hard to dispute. However, the dative makes little sense as it stands, *pace* James Porter ("Philodemus on Material Difference," *CronErcol* 19 [1989] 149–178, esp. 153 and 156). One would expect λόγωι to be part of the phrase "known not by reason, but by practised hearing," as used in the report on "Aristo" (*On Poems* 5, col. 20.24–26). Jensen changed the dative to λόγον to get an acceptable sense. Gomoll (above, n. 19, 382) inserted οὐκ before εἶναι. Mette proposed ἄτεχνον <τὴν σύνθεσιν> εἶναι <καὶ οὐ> λόγωι ... (fr. 86); however, what is ἄτεχνον is the thought (διάνοια), not σύνθεσις. I am inclined to agree that the scribe omitted some text after (and possibly before) εἶναι. Jensen's παραιτο[ύμε]ν[ος] (24.8) is also doubtful; Porter supplies παραιτο[ῖτ]' ἄν.

30	τ' ἔλεγεν οὗτος, ἐθαυμα- τοποίει τοῖς ὀνόμασι ξέ- νον οὐδὲ ἓν ἐπιν[οῶν.	But if he meant this, he was juggling with words without pro- posing anything strange.[34]

Philodemus objects that the only difference that the hearing can recognize is a difference in the placement and arrangement of letter sounds. He suggests that if this is what Crates meant there is nothing novel about his view. In fact, Crates did propose something novel: he held that there is a "natural difference" between good and bad poems, and that the hearing can discern this difference, which consists in the placement and arrangement of letter sounds. As Philodemus mentions at the very end of his account, Crates held that "the judgment of worthwhile poems" lies in the elementary letter sounds (στοιχεῖα).[35] Philodemus objects that the hearing can discern only purely auditory differences in the placement and arrangement of sounds; it cannot judge whether a poem is good or bad on the basis of these differences.

This criticism is a prelude to a sustained attack on Crates' notion of "natural" goodness. Philodemus' objections reveal a subtly elaborated theory that assures Crates a place among leading theorists of poetry in antiquity. The well preserved text is an important document in the history of poetics:

24 33	εἰ δὲ γίνεται περὶ τὴν ἀκο- ὴν ἐκ [π]οιημάτων [ἡδο-	If pleasure related to the hearing arises from poems, how did he not
35	νή, πῶς οὐ διέπιπτε κρί- νεσθαι λέγων οὐχ ὅταν	go wrong in saying that judgment is made, not whenever a worthwhile
25 1	εὐαρεστή[σηι] ταύτι π[όημα σπουδαῖ[ον, ἀ]λλ' [ὅταν κ]ατ[ὰ	poem pleases [the hearing], but whenever [a poem] is actualized in
	τὸ]ν τῆς τ[έ]χνης [λόγ]ον ἐνεργηθῆι; ἂν γὰρ τἆλ-	accordance with the rational account of the craft? For if one
5	λά τις ἀφῆι, κατὰ τὸν ταύ- της ἐνηρ[γ]εῖτ' ἂν λόγον	omits the rest, the composition would be actualized in accordance
	τὸ συντεθὲν οὕτως ὥσ- τ' εὐαρεστεῖν ταῖς ἀκοαῖς,	with the rational account of the craft so as to please the hearing,
	εἰ δὲ μ[ή γ]ε, κα[ὶ] ταύταις.	but if [it were] not [actualized in

[34] In line 15, I adopt Mangoni's reading; in line 27 I adopt Preuner's reading (as communicated to me by Mangoni) in place of Usener's and Jensen's διά[κριτ]ιν. Philodemus' earlier summary has the corresponding section: λοιπὸν ... λέ/[γ]ειν ὅτι διαγινώ[σ]κε/ται μὲν ἡ ἐν τοῖς ποιή/[μ]ασιν ὑπάρχουσα φυσι/[κὴ] διαφο[ρ]ὰ τῆι ἀκοῆι, / [κ]ρίνε[ται] δὲ σπουδαῖα / ... (*PHerc* 228, 1A.17–22 Mangoni). There follows another column, which shows just a few letters at the beginning of each line; it apparently belongs to the summary of Crates' poetics (see Jensen 155).

[35] Col. 26.8–11; see below. Porter (above, n. 33, esp. 157–158 and 168–170) suggests that Crates derived his notion of the placement and arrangement of sounds from the early atomists, who admitted position (θέσις) and arrangement (τάξις) as differentiae of the atoms. Although Crates' sounds are atoms of a sort, this resemblance seems to me insufficient to show that Crates' poetics has its roots in early atomism.

διὸ τ[ῆι τέχ]νη καὶ τὰ
τῆς κρίσεως παραδοθή-
σεσθα[ι, κ]αίπερ ἡδονῆι
κανο[νιζ]όμενον. ἀλλὰ
μὴν τὸ μὴ πολλὰ θέμα-
τ' εἶν[αι], διὸ δεῖν κατὰ
θέμα πολλὰ κρίνειν τῶν
ἐν πο[ιητ]ικῆι, βιάζεται
κα[ὶ ἀνο]υστερόν που πα-
ρ[αγγέλλ]εται. καὶ τόδε
μήτε τὰ α]ἰσθήσει ἐπι-
τ[ερπῆ] μήτε τὴν διά-
ν[οιαν δ]εῖν κρίνειν
τῶ[ν] ποιημάτων, ἀλλὰ
τὰ λογικὰ θεωρήματα
τὰ φύσει ὑπ[άρχο]ντα δι' αἰσ-
θήσεως κρ[ίνειν] καὶ οὐ-
κ ἄνευ τῶν [νοο]υμένων,
οὐ μέντοι τὰ νοούμε-
να, κωφά τ' ἐστι καὶ μι-
κροχαρῆ καὶ διεψευσμέ-
να, εἰ μὴ διείλη[π]ται τὸ
τὰ λογικὰ θε[ω]ρήματα
φύσει ὑπάρχειν. ἢ πρὸς λ[ό-
γον ἐστὶ τὸ διὰ τ[ῆς ἀ]κο-
ῆς τὰς λέξεις παραδέ-
χεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ ἀ-
ληθὲς [δεῖν τὰ νο]ούμε-
να ἐν ποητ[ικῆ]ι κρίνεσ-
θαι καὶ μηδ' ὅταν τὴν
σύνθεσιν ἐπαινῶμεν, ἀ-
ποσπᾶ[ν] αὐτὴν τῶν ὑπο-
τεταγμένων.

this way], [it would] also [please]
the hearing. Therefore, [he said],
judgment too will be handed
over to the craft, even though
[a good poem is] measured by
pleasure. Further, [his argument]
that there are not many
regulations, hence it is
necessary to judge many things in
poetry according to regulation,
is forced and proclaimed
rather stupidly. As to the claim
that one must judge neither
what is delightful to perception
nor the thought of poems, but
[one must] judge through per-
ception the rational theorems that
exist by nature, not without
thoughts—not, however, the
thoughts—, this is dumb,
of little cheer, and wrong,
unless it has been grasped
what it is for rational
theorems to exist by nature.
Either it
concerns reason that
the mind receives words through
the hearing; or it is true that
thoughts [must] be judged in poetry,
and that, even when we praise
the composition, we do not
sever it from the underlying
[thoughts].[36]

In defining the standard by which poetic goodness is judged, Crates draws a basic distinction: a poem is judged good not on the basis of a subjective response by the hearing, but on the basis of principles that exist objectively in a poem and are discerned by the hearing. A good poem has been "actualized" in accordance with these principles, so as to please the hearing. The principles are the "theorems" (θεωρήματα) of the craft of poetry; and they constitute the "rational account" (λόγος) of the craft. The theorems

[36]Instead of Jensen's ἐνκρ[ίν]ειν ἂν (col. 25.6), I propose ἐνηρ[γ]εῖτ' ἄν. This reading agrees better with the preserved letters: ENHPΠEITAN in O; ENK...EITAN in N; and ENH...EITAN in the papyrus, where T is entirely clear. It also agrees in sense and wording with what has just preceded. Mangoni has independently proposed the same reading.

are called "rational" (λογικά) because they constitute this λόγος. They exist by nature, and their presence in poems is judged empirically by the hearing.

Even though Crates maintained that everything is judged empirically (ἐμπείρως), the claim that there are rational principles that are implemented in a poem makes him a "rationalist" (λογικός) in the contemporary debate between rationalists and empiricists.[37] The empiricists, while admitting "theorems" constitutive of a craft, held that theorems are nothing more than collections of observations and cannot attain to the universality of rational principles. The rationalists differed widely among themselves. Crates' rationalism is clearly different from that of Plato, who proposed that objects of perception are ordered by principles that both exist apart from them and are known only by reason. Whereas Plato proposed that these principles, the Forms, are shared only imperfectly by perceptibles and grasped only imperfectly by perception, Crates held that the rational principles of poetry are actualized fully in poems and are discerned by perception. Crates' insistence on the empirical judgment of poems also distinguishes his position from rationalists such as the Pythagoreans, who held that the principles of music are judged by the intellect, not the hearing.[38]

Crates' position has an antecedent in Aristotle's view that technical production begins with a form (εἶδος) or rational account (λόγος), which exists in the craftsman's soul and is identical with the craft. This form is an activity (ἐνέργεια) which is implemented by the craftsman in the created object.[39] But Crates' immediate debt is to the Stoics. Adapting Aristotle's theory of form and actuality, the Stoics maintained that all things are shaped by an immanent λόγος, which pervades them as a natural force and may be apprehended by perception. They held that the wise person "is active" (or "actualizes," [ἐνεργείας] ἐνεργεῖ) in accordance with λόγος, or, equivalently, that whatever he is active at (or "is actualized," τὸ ἐνεργούμενον) comes from a "technical" disposition.[40] The craftsman's λόγος conforms to "theorems," which he puts into practice (*SVF* 3.214). In agreement with Stoic

[37]The debate between empiricism and rationalism divided the grammarians, along with rhetoricians, physicians, and others (see Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 1.60–61 and 72–74). Mette associated Crates with the "empiricists" (*Parateresis* 61). David Blank previously cast doubts on Mette's interpretation (*Ancient Philosophy and Grammar: The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus* [Chico, Calif. 1982] 3–4).

[38]Ps.-Plutarch *De musica* 1144 f.; see also the paper on "Aristo" (above, n. 16) 189–190. It is likely that, in stressing the empirical nature of judgment, Crates also distinguished his rationalism from that of grammarians such as Aristarchus, who proposed to judge the correctness of Greek diction by the principle of analogy together with customary usage. Taking a thoroughly empirical approach, Crates resisted supplementing empirical data by logical reconstruction.

[39]*Metaphysics* 1032a32–b14 and 1042b9–43a28.

[40]*SVF* 3.242; cf. 3.293; Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 11.205.

doctrine Crates proposes that a good poem is "actualized" (ἐνεργηθῆι) by a poet in accordance with the λόγος of his craft. As a euphonist, Crates conceives of the poet as "actualizing" his material—thoughts and diction—in accordance with the principles of good sound.[41] Although the Stoics did not agree that the poetic craft consists only of principles of good sound, Crates shared with them the notion of the poet as a craftsman who fashions a rationally ordered poem in accordance with the principles of his craft. Just like the Stoic "Aristo," Crates holds that good composition is judged by the practised hearing, not by reason. This Stoic demanded not only good composition (with attendant euphony) but also good thought (διάνοια), which is judged by reason. In contrast, Crates requires only euphony, but he agrees that euphony must be judged empirically by the hearing. Underlying both positions is the assumption of an immanent λόγος, the source of all goodness.

Along with Stoic doctrine, Crates has taken over Stoic terminology. His usage is not consistently Stoic but is overlaid with Stoic terms. Apart from the expressions just mentioned, he uses the Stoic technical term σπουδαῖον, "worthwhile," to designate a "good" poem.[42] Especially striking is the use of εὐαρεστεῖν, "please," to describe the effect of a good poem on the hearing (col. 25.1 and 8). This relatively rare term was appropriated by the Stoics to describe what is, strictly, good.[43] In drawing his distinction between subjective and objective criteria, Crates carefully substitutes this Stoic term for the commonplace term ἡδονή, "pleasure" (with its verbal form ἥδεσθαι).[44] The Stoics dissociated pleasure (ἡδονή) from the good, defining it as either an irrational emotion or an accompaniment of a primary natural goal. Strictly speaking, a good poem does not cause "pleasure," but "pleases" (εὐαρεστεῖ). Philodemus' report is too compressed to show whether Crates is making a concession to ordinary language by using ἡδονή / ἥδεσθαι in a wide sense to include "being pleased" or whether he uses these terms in the way a Stoic would, to refer to the response of ordinary persons who lack technical knowledge. In the latter case, Crates points out that a good poem brings "pleasure" to ordinary persons but provokes the response of "being

[41]Elsewhere in *On Poems*, *PHerc* 460, tr. B, fr. 21.8–9 Sbordone, Philodemus draws a distinction between the "material" (ὕλη) of a poem and the person "who actualizes it" (τῶι ἐνεργοῦντι αὐτὴν), and claims that both are necessary to a poem and that there is no cause of goodness apart from them. It is possible that he is here engaged in a dispute with a critic who viewed thoughts and diction as "material" used by the poet.

[42]Col. 25.2; see above, n. 24. Other examples of Crates' use of the term are at col. 26.10 and *PHerc* 228, 1A.21 Mangoni. Crates' repeated use of ἐπαινεῖν, "praise," with reference to what is good is also Stoic.

[43]Cleanthes qualifies the "good" as εὐάρεστον (*SVF* 1.557). The noun εὐαρέστησις designates the wise person's satisfaction with whatever happens (*SVF* 2.912).

[44]The commonplace terms occur at cols. 24.34–35 and 25.12, and *PHerc* 228, 1A.13 Mangoni.

pleased" in the technically accomplished judge who discerns the rational principles actualized in a poem.

It is tempting to suppose that Crates' usage was influenced by a debate with the Epicureans. In support of his demand for an objective criterion, he seems to have argued that if one "omits" the requirement that the poem be worked out according to the λόγος of the craft, then a poem would be judged good simply on the basis of a subjective feeling, without any recognition of its intrinsic merit. When the requirement is added, on the other hand, the judgment of a poem, just like its creation, belongs to a craft. Presumably, both the professional critic and the poet have this craft.[45] Philodemus accuses Crates of drawing a false distinction. According to the Epicureans, the criterion for any perceptible state of affairs is subjective experience. Consequently, if a poem is good whenever there is auditory pleasure, then this pleasure is the "measure" (κανών) of the poem's goodness.[46] As Philodemus makes clear throughout *On Poems*, he rejects auditory pleasure as the sole or primary criterion of poetic goodness. But since, according to the Epicureans, pleasure is the measure of all good, he would approve the general claim that the goodness of poem is "measured (κανονιζόμενον) by pleasure"; the pleasure, as Philodemus understands it, would be primarily an intellectual pleasure.

Crates may well have used the Epicurean phrase "measured by pleasure" to show how his position differs from that of the Epicureans. While admitting pleasure as a "measure" of poetic goodness, he adds a qualification: this pleasure is the auditory response—properly called "being pleased"—of an expert, judging in accordance with the technical principles that inhere in a poem. In common with the Stoics, Crates insists that there is an objectively existing λόγος that is responsible for the hearing's response, which is not simply a feeling of delight, but an apprehension of a rational order. Crates' previous polemics increase the likelihood that he is engaged in a debate with the Epicureans. This is the more interesting as we know of no Epicurean discussion of poetry between Epicurus' generation and Zeno's leadership of the Epicurean school at the end of the second century B.C.[47] It appears that the Epicureans kept up an interest in poetry in the intervening period. Philodemus' objections suggest a coherent attack on all allegedly expert judgment: just as the utility of poems is judged by ordinary people, so a poem is judged good if it provokes pleasure, whether or not the hearer is an expert poet or critic.

[45]In line 9, which is extremely elliptical, I understand εὐαρεστεῖν (in a contrapositive construction) with ταύταις.

[46]Epicurus proposed that pleasure is the κανών of everything good (*Letter to Menoeceus* 129).

[47]See E. Asmis, "Epicurean Poetics," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 7 (1991) 63–105.

Philodemus' next point seems to break the continuity of the exposition. He accuses Crates of constructing a forced argument concerning "regulations" (θέματα): since there are not many regulations, many things must be judged according to regulation. Since Crates' whole poetic theory is based on a rejection of regulations in favor of natural principles as standards of judgment, his argument appears to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of his opponents' position. Crates of course does not deny that there are regulations; but these, he argues, cannot be used to judge a poem. He now makes the point that too few rules are stretched over too many things. It would seem to follow that only the naturally existing "theorems" that he proposed can do justice to the rich complexity of poems.[48]

The final section of the cited passage summarizes Crates' entire position, and there is a great deal concentrated in it. Crates' basic assumption is that a poem is a composite of sound and meaning. In judging a poem, he maintains, one must judge neither the sound as immediately perceived nor the meanings (or "thoughts," νοούμενα) that constitute a poem's overall "thought" (διάνοια). Instead, one must judge the "rational principles" of sound "through perception," and one must not judge the principles of sound "without the thoughts," even though one does not judge the thoughts themselves. The judgment of a poem, therefore, does not consist in a purely sensory response to an auditory impression nor in an evaluation of the meaning, but in a discernment of objective principles of sound in relation to the meaning. By using the phrase "through perception" (δι' αἰσθήσεως) Crates makes clear that the principles, however "rational," are judged by an act of perception. He also makes clear that in an act of perception the mind judges "through" perception. In agreement with Stoic doctrine, Crates supposes that the sensory organ passes information to the mind, which makes the perceptual judgment.[49] Strictly speaking, therefore, whenever a poem is judged by the hearing, it is judged by the mind "through" the hearing. The mind grasps both the sound and the meaning of words in a single act of judgment that is directed at the sound as a vehicle of meaning, not at the meanings themselves.

Philodemus objects, quite reasonably, that there is need to clarify what it is "for rational theorems to exist by nature." As an Epicurean, he wholly

[48]This line of argument also fits Crates' debate with the analogists: the relatively few stipulative rules of the analogists, he might have argued, fail to correspond to the rich variety of actual word usage. Crates' *reductio* was misinterpreted by Jensen (166) as a demand for a single θέμα, having to do with allegorical interpretation. Porter imputes judgment by θέματα to both Crates and the critics (above, n. 33, esp. 165–166). However, the only group that endorses θέματα as standards of judgment in Philodemus' text are the philosophers mentioned at the very beginning, and they are not "critics."

[49]Cicero offers the same explanation of how the hearing judges verbal composition at *Orator* 177: *aures enim vel animus aurium nuntio naturalem quandam in se continet vocum omnium mensionem.*

rejects the Stoic notion of an immanent λόγος. In the disjunction that follows Philodemus seems to suggest that there are just two ways of understanding "rational theorems": since the mind receives the words through the hearing, the rational faculty is involved in the judgment of theorems, and this is what makes them "rational"; or the meanings, which constitute the rational element in a poem, are judged along with the verbal form.[50] Crates would deny either possibility. Philodemus himself was adamant that in judging a poem one must judge the thought that underlies the words. Crates does not take the extremely radical position that what makes a poem good is simply the sound, considered apart from any meaning. He would not dispute that one must not "sever" the verbal form from the meaning. His point, which is radical enough, is that what makes a poem good is the sound in relation to the meaning, regardless of what the meaning is. On this point he differs with the entire philosophical tradition, including Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and Epicureans.

Philodemus has now sketched the theoretical framework of Crates' poetics. But he has not told us what sort of sound Crates considered good. Unfortunately, Philodemus abandons us with a reference to the second book of his treatise:

26	7	... τὰ δὲ	As for his [teachings]
		περὶ τῶν στοιχείων, ἐ-	concerning the elements,
		ν ο[ἷς] τὴν κρί[σ]ιν εἶναί φη-	in which he says the judgment
	10	σι τῶν σπου[δ]α[ίων] ποι-	of worthwhile poems consists,
		ημάτων, τίνος αὐτῶι	we have shown in the second book of
		καὶ πόσης ἡδονῆς γέ-	these writings with what pleasure
		με[ι π]αρεστακότες ἐν	and how great a pleasure they
		τ[ῶ]ι δευτέρωι τῶν ὑ-	are crammed, since they apply
	15	πομνημάτων διὰ τὸ	commonly to the topic
		καὶ περὶ ποιήματος εἶ-	of the poem,
		ναι κοινῶς, ἀποδοκιμά-	and so we decline to go
		ζομ]εν παλιλλογε[ῖ]ν.	over them again.

Philodemus does indeed say a great deal about sound in other parts of *On Poems*, with frequent attacks on individuals, mostly nameless, who proposed euphonic theories. The name of Crates does not appear in any of these fragments.[51] In many cases, the opponent could be Crates; but he might also be some other euphonist. Still, there is a cluster of fragments that seem to bear the imprint of Crates and I propose to plunge briefly into these texts.

[50]Contrary to Jensen, I take διάνοιαν at col. 26.1 to be "mind," not (as elsewhere in Philodemus' discussion of Crates) "thought"; cf. col. 20.35.

[51]The name Crates occurs clearly in only one other fragment (see above, nn. 12 and 21).

But first, let us take stock of Crates' position as it has emerged so far. There are two main points. First, Crates held that what makes a poem good is nothing other than good sound. This demand is consistent with his profession as a "critic"; and it clearly demarcates his position from that of the Stoics, who demanded both good thought and good composition. Second, Crates' theory of good sound is in agreement with Stoic doctrine. His poetics, therefore, is not Stoic, as has been assumed traditionally; nor is it exempt from Stoic influence, as has also been proposed.[52] It is the work of a "critic" who adopted some Stoic principles while rejecting others. Crates' recognition of just one criterion of good poetry, sound, may surprise the reader in view of his well-attested concern with the meaning of words and, in particular, his inclination toward allegorical explanation. However, Crates' concern with content does not imply that he believed that the type of content was relevant to poetic goodness. As a "critic" and "judge" of poems, he investigated the meanings, as well as the sounds, of words. The meanings, he held, must be grasped in order for a poem to be judged good; but whether or not the meanings are praiseworthy makes no difference to the goodness of a poem.[53]

[52] Jensen added his authority to the traditional view of Crates as a Stoic. In his essay on Crates, he contrasts Crates' Stoicism with the euphonic theories of the "critics" (149) and reconstructs for Crates a theory of poetic judgment which culminates in the allegorical judgment of a poem's thought (166, 169–172). On the opposing side, Mette interprets Crates as an empiricist, sharing the assumptions of the empiricist doctors (above, n. 37); and Porter interprets Crates as a materialist in the tradition of Democritean atomism (above, n. 35). All these interpretations capture some aspect of Crates' poetics.

[53] The question may be asked whether Crates' poetics could fit into a Stoic scheme by means of a redefinition of "poem" as "verbal composition" (σύνθεσις), as distinct from content or "theme." A narrow definition of this sort may be traced back to Neoptolemus, who seems to have lived in the third century B.C. In his threefold division of the craft of poetry into poet, "poetry" (ποίησις), and "poem" (ποίημα), Neoptolemus associated "theme" (ὑπόθεσις) with "poetry," and "composition" (σύνθεσις) with "poem" (*On Poems* 5, esp. cols. 11.26–12.6). In Stoicism, a narrow definition of "poem" is first attested for Posidonius, who defined "poem" as "metrical or rhythmical diction, with elaboration, going beyond prose form," and "poetry" as "a poem with meaning (σημαντικὸν ποίημα), containing an imitation of divine and human things" (Diogenes Laertius 7.60, fr. 44 Edelstein-Kidd). It is plausible that the narrow definition of "poem" reflects attempts to define the goodness of a poem in terms of verbal composition alone; but of course it does not solve the problem of what makes a poet or poetic work good. As Crates' terminology shows, he chose to regard not only a "poem" but also the poet and the whole craft of poetry as concerned only with good sound. The Stoics considered both verbal composition and theme essential to the poetic craft. Thus Crates might be viewed as setting out part of a Stoic requirement for poetic craftsmanship; but he does not supply the whole requirement. If Crates did adopt the tripartite division of the poetic craft (above, n. 21), then he viewed "poetry" as an nontechnical part of the craft.

SEQUEL: CRATES IN *ON POEMS*, *PHERC* 460?

In many of the fragments belonging to *On Poems*, Philodemus discusses the construction of verses out of individual letters, syllables, and words. He distinguishes in detail between pleasant and unpleasant sounds.[54] He also reports a distinction between a natural and an unnatural way of putting together letters into syllables.[55] The concern with elementary sounds and "natural" construction fits Crates' poetics, but it also fits the critics in general. There is one remarkable fragment, however, which shares an unusual feature with Philodemus' report about Crates. The text has been severed from its context, but it is well preserved.

PHerc 460, 8, tr. B, fr. 20, col. 1.6–24, Sb:

1 6	ἤχοις ὅμοιοι γινόμ[ενοι	... succeed in being similar
	κατατυγχάνουσι. οἱ γ[ὰρ ἰ-	in sound. For iambic poets
	αμβοποιοὶ τραγικὰ ποι-	compose tragic poems and
	οῦσιν καὶ οἱ τραγω<ι>δοποι-	tragic poets compose iambic,
10	οὶ πάλιν ἰαμβικὰ καὶ Σαπ-	and Sappho composes
	φώ τινα ἰαμβικῶς ποιεῖ,	some poems in an iambic
	καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος οὐκ ἰαμ-	manner and Archilochus not
	βικῶς, ὥστε φύσει μὲν	in an iambic manner.
	οὐ ῥ]ητέον ἰαμβοποιὸν	Hence, one must not say that
15	ἢ ἄλλ]ο τι ποιοῦντα γένος,	by nature he is an iambic poet
	ἀλλὰ νόμωι, φύσ[ει] δὲ ὅταν	or composes another kind [of
	εἰς τὴν εὐγενῆ φωνὴν	poem], but [that he does so] by
	καὶ πρώτην καὶ εἰς πάν-	convention, and that [poets com-
	τ' ἐναρμόττουσαν οἱ πο-	pose] by nature whenever in their
20	ηταὶ ἐμπεσόντες ὀνο-	wording they hit upon sound that
	μάζωσι, ὅταν τε ἐν	is noble, first, and adapted to all
	παντὶ γένει ποήματος	things, and whenever in every
	ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος διατ<ε>ίνηι,	kind of poem the same rational
	καὶ	account extends, and ....

The underlying assumption in this passage is that there is a single λόγος "extending through" and existing "in every kind of poem." Unusual as this notion is, it agrees with Crates' notion of a λόγος that is actualized in poems. According to our fragment this λόγος is present whenever poets naturally succeed in producing a certain kind of sound in their wording. Similarly Crates proposed that poets work out good sound in accordance with a λόγος that exists by nature. The fragment adds a distinction between convention (νόμος) and nature (φύσις): by convention, poets differ according to genre; by nature, poets are alike in producing a certain kind of sound. Judged by the "natural" standard of sound, therefore, all genres are

[54] See for example, *PHerc* 460 + 1073, tr. B, frs. 6, 7, 9 and 10 Sbordone.
[55] *PHerc* 460, tr. B, fr. 8 Sbordone.

alike; what distinguishes them is convention. This view is nothing short of revolutionary. For it implies that epic and tragedy are not inherently superior to iambic and lyric, as Aristotle and a longstanding tradition assumed. The distinction between "convention" and "nature," moreover, fits Crates' contrast between "regulations" (θέματα) and "nature"; for the conventions by which genres are distinguished are irrelevant or incidental to the natural difference in sound that is discerned by the hearing.[56]

The fragment also offers an unusual description of what poets naturally do: in their "use of words" they "hit upon sound that is noble, first, and adapted to all things" (εἰς τὴν εὐγενῆ φωνὴν καὶ πρώτην καὶ εἰς πάντ' ἐναρμόττουσαν οἱ ποηταὶ ἐμπεσόντες ὀνομάζωσι). The three descriptions are all puzzling in various ways. To begin with the phrase "adapted to all things," it may signify "universally suitable sound," that is, sound that is appropriate to any subject matter or type of poem. The claim that "the same λόγος" extends through all poems supports this interpretation. But the expression may also signify "adapted to every kind of matter individually." It was and remains a truism that diction should be adapted to the particular subject matter. This meaning, moreover, is compatible with the first suggestion, since universally suitable sound may be precisely the sort of sound that is adapted to the particular subject matter.

How closely, then, and by what means would the sound be adapted to the subject matter? The ancients held many different views of this adaptation. Elsewhere in *On Poems*, Philodemus mentions the adaptation of sound to characters and their mental attitudes or "dispositions":

> ... the grandeur (μέγεθος) of the sound that belongs to good composition will be adapted (ἐναρμόσει) to every character and every disposition.[57]

According to this view, the grandeur or lack of grandeur of the sound reflects the elevation or lowliness of the characters and their inner disposition. The author of *On the Sublime* shows in detail how verbal composition contributes to the general elevation of a literary work, especially in the choice of rhythms. He describes dactylic rhythms as "most noble and productive of grandeur" (εὐγενέστατοι ... καὶ μεγεθοποιοί).[58] Demetrius

[56] Philodemus exemplifies genre-related "regulations" (θέματα) at *PHerc* 1676, tr. C, cols. 20(9).18–21(10).4 Sbordone. He claims that we follow θέματα, to which we have become accustomed by nature (πεφ[υσι]ωμένο[ι]), when we reject the word "thrashed" (συνκεκόφθαι) as unsuitable in tragedy, but welcome it as beautiful in iambic poetry, and when we are pained by long compounds in tragedy and epic, but not in dithyrambs.

[57] *PHerc* 994, tr. A, col. x.19–23 Sbordone: [τὸ μὲ]ν / μέγεθος [φ]ωνῆς ἐν συν/θέσει χρηστῆι κείμενον / ἐναρμόσει παντὶ προσ[ώ]/πω[ι] καὶ διαθέσει πάσηι. I suggest that [π]ράγμασιν be read in line 8 to yield: "they are accustomed to adapt something to a character and disposition and, in general, to things" (col. x.6–9 Sbordone).

[58] "Longinus" *On the Sublime* 39.4.

cites hiatus as an example of sound that produces "grandeur" (*On Style* 73; cf. 105). Dionysius of Halicarnassus not only shows what sounds exalt and diminish, but also recommends the closest possible adaptation of sound to subject matter. The topic, he says, was investigated by many before him, starting with Socrates in Plato's *Cratylus*. With a clear debt to Plato, Dionysius claims that "nature" taught us to fashion words that are "imitations" (μιμήματα) not only of sound, but also of "shape, deed, suffering, motion, rest, and anything whatsoever." Dionysius concludes that "from the first arrangement of letters" (ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κατασκευῆς τῶν γραμμάτων) a writer creates verbal differences that show the "moral habits, emotions, dispositions, deeds, and related attributes of the characters."[59] Philodemus is wholly opposed to this view: he insists repeatedly that sounds cannot imitate things but can only imitate the sounds of things.[60]

Among the "many" predecessors of Dionysius who believed in a natural correspondence of sound and meaning were the Stoics. This brings us to the second descriptive term, the most intriguing of all. What is "first sound"? There are two attested usages of this expression. A "first sound" can be a basic, indivisible element (στοιχεῖον) out of which other verbal sounds are constructed.[61] It is possible that, just as Dionysius assumes that the adaptation of sound to subject matter begins with individual letters, so the theorist of our fragment proposes that poets should find the right kind of elementary sounds. This would agree very well with Crates' poetics. But "first sound" was also used to designate the words first used by humans in the development of language. The Stoics held that words are by nature (φύσει), not imposition (θέσει); for "first sounds (πρῶται φωναί) imitate the things named by them."[62] As Augustine explains, sometimes there is a similarity between the sound of a word and the sound of the thing that it names; these words are onomatopoeic. But there can also be a similarity between the sound of a word and the non-auditory impact of the thing on the senses:

[59] *De compositione* 16 (pp. 158–160 Roberts). Dionysius cites anapaests as an example of sound that confers "grandeur or emotion on the subject matter" (*De compositione* 17, p. 172 Roberts).

[60] *On Poems* 4, col. 8.10–13 Sbordone: [φω]νῆι κα[ὶ ψό]φοις ἀδ[ύ]να/[τον] εἶναι πράγματα μιμεῖ/σθαι καὶ μὴ μόνον φωνὰς / καὶ ψόφους αὐτῶν. Philodemus makes the same point in *On Poems* 5, col. 32.16–20: it is completely crazy to assume ὁμοιότητα / λέξεως τοῖς δηλουμέ/νοις πράγμασιν. See also *On Rhetoric* 4, col. 5.12–16, v. 1, p. 150 Sudhaus: [μιμ]εῖσ[θ]α[ι] δὲ / τὰ πράγματ[α μ]ὲν φω/ναῖς ο[ὐ] δυν[ατ]όν ἐσ/τιν, ἤχους [δέ τι]νας / καὶ ψόφους.

[61] Scholia on Dionysius Thrax, 31.6–7, 181.1–2, 182.12–13, 299.39 Hilgard, etc.; cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, 2.3 Uhlig. See also Ax (above, n. 10) 235.

[62] Origen *Contra Celsum* 1.24 (Hülser 643, *SVF* 2.146): according to the Stoics, words are φύσει, μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα, καθ' ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα. See Karl Barwick, *Probleme der stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik* (Berlin 1957) 30–33.

But since there are things that do not make a sound, in these cases the similarity of touch applies; thus, if [things] touch the sense smoothly or roughly, just as the smoothness or roughness of letters touches the hearing, so it has produced names for them. For example, when we say *lene* ("smooth"), the word itself sounds smoothly. Likewise, who would not judge roughness (*asperitatem*) rough in its very name? .... Things themselves affect us in the same way as words are perceived. In the case of honey (*mel*), as sweetly as the thing itself touches the taste, so smoothly does it touch the hearing with its name. *acre* ("harsh") is rough in both ways .... They believed that this is, as it were, the cradle of words, when the sensory perceptions of things agree with (*concordarent*) the sensory perception of the sounds.[63]

This is an attempt to place the theory that words resemble things on a firmer basis than Plato did in the *Cratylus*. According to the Stoics, the resemblance lies in a common perceptual feature: the nature of a thing is expressed in sound that makes a similar sensory impact to the thing itself. The underlying assumption is that there is a similarity that pervades all five senses in such a way that a certain sound corresponds to a certain taste or touch, or (although Augustine does not illustrate these senses) sight or smell. On the basis of the first, imitative words, the Stoics held, other words are formed by similarity, proximity, or opposition between the denoted things.

Is it possible, then, that the author who appears in our fragment calls for Stoic "first sound"? The poet cannot, of course, restore the words first uttered in the history of mankind. He must use words that are understood by others; and these are remote from historically "first sounds." However, he can select and arrange conventional words in such a way that they have qualities of sound that imitate things in the same way as historically "first sounds." Poetically fashioned "first sound" might be said to recreate, naturally, the sort of sound first used to name things, as far as conventional usage allows. Poets could be said to "hit upon" this type of sound because they discover it spontaneously, by their own natural sensitivity to perceptual similarities, without prescribed rules—as Crates would say, without θέματα.

"First sound," on this interpretation, would be "primary" in the sense of forming the natural basis of language, whether historically first or created

[63] Augustine *De dialectica* 6 (94 Pinborg, Hülser 644). The complete Latin passage is: *sed quia sunt res quae non sonant, in his similitudinem tactus valere, ut, si leniter vel aspere sensum tangunt, lenitas vel asperitas litterarum ut tangit auditum sic eis nomina pepererit: ut ipsum "lene" cum dicimus leniter sonat. quis item "asperitatem" non et ipso nomine asperam iudicet? Lene est auribus cum dicimus "voluptas," asperum cum dicimus "crux." ita res ipsae afficiunt, ut verba sentiuntur. mel quam suaviter gustum res ipsa, tam leniter nomine tangit auditum. "acre" in utroque asperum est. "lana" et "vepres" ut audiuntur verba, sic illa tanguntur. haec quasi cunabula verborum esse crediderunt, ubi sensus rerum cum sonorum sensu concordarent.*

subsequently. Since there is no precise parallel for such a usage, this interpretation is speculative. However, there seems to be no reason why Stoic "first sounds" must be restricted to a historical period; for humans still have the same natural gifts. In our fragment, the phrase "adapted to all things," together with the Stoic notion of a naturally pervasive λόγος, offers some small support for taking "first sound" as naturally imitative "primary sound." But even if "first sound" is not Stoic "primary sound," then there is still a good possibility that the theorist of our fragment proposed a Stoic type of adaptation of sound to subject matter, starting with individual letters. We know that the Stoic Cleanthes assumed a special affinity between poetic diction and its subject matter. Philodemus reports in the fourth book of *On Music* (col. 28.2–14, Neubecker):[64]

28	2	... ὅς φησιν	[Cleanthes] says
		ἀ]μείνο[νά] τε εἶναι τὰ ποητικὰ	that poetic and musical
		καὶ μ[ουσ]ικὰ παραδείγματα	examples are better:
	5	καὶ τοῦ [λόγ]ου τοῦ τῆς φιλοσο-	philosophical discourse
		φίας ἱκανῶς μὲν ἐξαγ[γ]έλ-	can report divine and
		λειν δυναμένου τὰ θεῖα καὶ	human affairs adequately,
		ἀ[ν]θ[ρ]ώ[πινα], μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ	but plain prose does not have
		ψειλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν	diction that is proper to divine
	10	λέξεις οἰκείας, τὰ μέτρα καὶ	greatness: instead, meters,
		τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς	melodies, and rhythms come
		ὡς μάλιστα προσικνεῖσθαι	as close as possible to the truth
		πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν	of the contemplation of
		θείων θ[ε]ωρίας.	divinity.

In this little-noticed passage, Cleanthes makes the surprising claim that poetic diction can bring a person closer to the truth about god than philosophical prose. In common with others, the Stoics held that diction must be appropriate to the subject matter (οἰκεία τῷ πράγματι).[65] They also shared the common view that meter and melody can enhance the greatness of the subject matter. But Cleanthes gave a strong interpretation to this aggrandizement by proposing that meter and melody can actually improve one's recognition of the truth about divinity. In his report of Cleanthes' doctrine Seneca appears to assign the same epistemic force to poetic diction. He points out that the "confining necessity of song makes our perceptions (*sensus*) clearer," and that the metrical form of a poem impresses an exalted sense (*sensum*) more forcefully on the mind than plain prose.[66] Both

[64] See further the paper on "Aristo" (above, n. 16) 194–195.

[65] Diogenes Laertius 7.59; this is the Stoic definition of the "fitting" (πρέπον) in diction.

[66] Seneca *Epistle* 108.10 (partly at *SVF* 1.487), including: *nam, ut dicebat Cleanthes, quemadmodum spiritus noster clariorem sonum reddit, cum illum tuba per longi canalis angustias tractum patentiore novissime exitu effudit, sic sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit. eadem neglegentius audiuntur minusque percutiunt, quamdiu*

Philodemus and Seneca mention only metrical and musical qualities. But if these qualities of poetic sound reinforce meaning by an imitation of the subject matter, then we would expect the sound of letters too, both individually and in combination, to enhance understanding by their imitation of things.

To return to our fragment, the remaining descriptive term "noble" ("well-born," εὐγενής) is clearest in meaning, as well as astonishing. It implies a rejection of the commonplace association of "noble" sounds or words with certain genres, in particular epic and tragedy.[67] All genres, including the traditionally lowly iambic, use naturally "noble" words. How we understand this nobility depends on our interpretation of the other two expressions. At the very least, the theorist of our fragment proposes sound that is consistently noble in all kinds of poems. Whatever the precise meaning of "first," it is likely that he conceived of this nobility as based on elementary letter sounds. At the extreme end of our interpretative range, he may even have proposed sound that is naturally imitative in the manner of Stoic "first sounds." Whatever the exact interpretation, the author has refashioned the ordinary sense of εὐγενής. Since his subject is euphony and he takes a Stoic view of λόγος, it would not be surprising if, in the manner of the Stoics, he assigned to εὐγενῆ φωνήν the etymological sense of "well-created" sound, with a play on "euphony."

Despite uncertainties of interpretation, our fragment (20) fits Crates' poetics well. It could also fit other critics; and I see no way of excluding them. But could the theory also fit a Stoic philosopher? The claim that "natural" poetic activity deals with sound points to Crates and the critics, but is hardly conclusive. Two more fragments, closely related in content to our fragment, help to exclude the Stoics. Belonging to the same papyrus, these fragments are also well preserved, although they too have been torn from their context.

The first of these fragments (19 in Sbordone's numbering) introduces a proof that sound alone makes poets preeminent.

PHerc 460, 24, tr. B, fr. 19.9–26, Sb:

19	9	... ἀπόδειξιν τοί-	Announcing a proof
	10	νυν ἐπαγγειλάμενος ὅτι	that good poets rank
		οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποηταὶ πα[ρ]' οὐ-	first and alone endure
		δὲν ἄλλο πρωτεύουσίν	for no other reason

soluta oratione dicuntur; ubi accessere numeri et egregium sensum astrinxere certi pedes, eadem illa sententia velut lacerto excussiore torquetur.

[67] In addition to "Longinus" (as previously cited above, n. 58), Dionysius of Halicarnassus distinguishes between noble and ignoble letter sounds (*De compositione* 14, pp. 146–148 Roberts), rhythms (chapters 17–18, pp. 170–178 Roberts), and verbal composition in general (for example, chapter 4, p. 90 Roberts).

	τε καὶ μόνοι διαμένουσιν	than sounds, and saying
	ἢ παρὰ τοὺς ἤχους, καὶ ἐν	that he showed [else-
15	ἄλ[λοις ε]ἰπὼν π[α]ρεστα-	where] that Homer, Archilochus,
	κέν[αι] διότι μόνοι ταὐτὸ	and Euripides alone
	πο[οῦ]σιν Ὅμηρός τε καὶ Ἀρ-	do the same thing—
	χίλοχος καὶ Εὐ[ρ]ιπίδης,	also Sophocles and
	πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Σοφοκλῆς	Philoxenus, and similarly
20	καὶ Φιλόξενος, ὁμοίως δὲ	Timotheus who mixes
	καὶ Τιμόθεος τὰ ποήμα-	their poems—,
	τ' αὐτῶν μίσγων, νῦν δὲ	but intending now to
	περὶ τῶν ἤχων μ[έλλ]ων	discuss sounds, he somehow
	διαλέξεσθαι, τὴν [μὲ]ν χά-	attributes irrational
25	ριν τὴν ἄλογόν π[ω]ς τοῖς	charm to the same
	αὐτοῖς ἀνατιθεὶς	things ....

Philodemus' opponent ranks Homer, Archilochus, Euripides, and the rest as leading poets because they all alike created good sound.[68] The opponent recognizes only sound as a criterion of poetic excellence. Like the theorist of our earlier fragment (20), he holds that good sound is the same in poems of different genres. Indeed, he draws attention to the irrelevance of generic differences by including Timotheus, who mixed genres, in his list of good poets. The view that only sound makes a difference to poetic goodness licenses the mixing of genres.

In the second fragment (17), Philodemus' opponent defends his comparison of poets of different genres.

PHerc 460, 26, tr. B, fr. 17.8–27 Sb:

17	8	... δι-	He says it will make
		οίσει δὲ οὐδέν, φησίν, οὐδ' ἐ-	no difference, not even
	10	ὰν Ἀρχίλοχον ἢ Εὐριπί-	if we compare Archilochus
		δην ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ Ὁμή-	or Euripides or someone
		ρωι συμβάλλωμεν, ἂν μό-	else with Homer, if only
		νον ἑκατέρου τὴν ἐπαι-	we juxtapose the
		νουμένην ἀντιπαρατι-	praised diction of each.
	15	θῶμεν λέξιν. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι	For just because tragedy,
		διάφορον [ἔ]που<ς> τραγωι-	iambic, and lyric differ
		δία καὶ ἴαμβος καὶ τὸ ἐμ-	from epic we will not
		μελές, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐ συμβα-	refrain from comparing
		λοῦμεν ἐξ ἑτέρου γέ-	poets of different genres,
	20	νους ποητὴν ποητεῖ,	since the goal is
		τοῦ τέλους ὑπά[ρχο]ντος	the same for each genre.

[68] Aristotle (*Poetics* 2, 1448a15) cites Timotheus and Philoxenus as composers of dithyrambs and nomes, in connection with the depiction of better, worse, and similar characters. Timotheus (ca 450–360 B.C.) experimented in combining various meters and, in general, was innovative in the creation of intricate musical effects.

	παντὶ γένει ταὐτο<ῦ>. πᾶ-	For it follows that all
	σαν γὰρ ἀκολουθε[ῖ τ]ὴν ἐ-	diction in them is
	ν αὐτοῖς λέξιν καλῶς	inserted beautifully, or
25	ἢ μέσως ἢ φαύλως ἐγ-	badly, or indifferently,
	κεῖσθαι, τούτου δ' [ὅ]ντος	and this occurs
	τ]ότε, ὅταν ἁπάντω[ν] ἐκ	whenever at all ....[69]

Citing three of the same poets as appear in fragment 19, the opponent argues that it makes no difference whether the poems are of different genres because "the goal is the same" for all. As in fragments 19 and 20, poets of different genres are praised for doing the same thing. In this fragment the goal is identified as beautiful diction. The text breaks off before any further explanation is given; but in view of the link with frs. 19 and 20, it is plausible to understand beautiful diction as diction with good sound or simply as good verbal sound. The division of diction into three kinds, beautiful, bad, and intermediate, is a Stoic feature.[70] But the view that poetic goodness consists in diction alone sets the doctrine apart from Stoicism.

The three fragments (20, 19, and 17) together appear to propose a single, coherent position: poets excel for no other reason than that they create diction that sounds good. Good sound is naturally the same in all genres of poetry and extends through all genres as the same λόγος. Although this position is influenced by Stoicism, it excludes a basic Stoic requirement of good poetry—good thought. The author appears to be a "critic" and if he is not Crates, he is someone very much like him.[71]

DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO, IL 60637

[69]In line 12, the transcript has AH, which is readily corrected to ἂν. Hausrath and Sbordone read <ἢ> ἂν. In the original numbering of the papyrus fragments, this fragment follows immediately upon fr. 18 Sbordone (*PHerc* 460, 25), which in turn follows upon fr. 19 Sbordone (*PHerc* 460, 24). The original numbering suggests, although it does not prove, that the three fragments were fairly close together in the original papyrus (separated perhaps by one or two columns from each other, as Richard Janko has suggested to me). Fr. 18 Sbordone is closely related in content to frs. 17 and 19. Using Stoic vocabulary, the opponent asserts that "the worthwhile and bad" lies alone in the "interweaving ([συμ]πλοκῆς), praiseworthy or to be avoided, of dialect" (fr. 18.6–13 Sbordone). It should be noted, however, that the original numbering of fr. 20 Sbordone (*PHerc*7 460, 8) places it far apart from frs. 17–19 Sbordone.

[70]The Stoic theorist ("Aristo") attacked by Philodemus in *On Poems* 5, cols. 14–21, classified all poems, as well as thought and composition, as good, bad, or neither.

[71]I am very grateful to the anonymous readers for *Phoenix* for their many valuable suggestions.